> [C] YUGOSLAVIA: TWELVE FATAL MISTAKES BY INSIDE AND OUTSIDE PARTIES

> By Johan Galtung, dr hc mult, Professor of Peace Studies;

> Director, TRANSCEND: A Peace and Development Network



> > [1] The failure to take seriously the European macro-divides,

> Catholic-Orthodox and Christian-Muslim, playing with fire inside

> Croatia, Serbia and B-i-H, playing with fire in the near context

> and in the remote context; EU, Russia, Ottoman/Muslim countries,

> and the USA that ultimately came down on the side of the latter.

> To get an "anchor" in Eurasia? An oil corridor? A Muslim empire?



> > [2] The failure to take seriously Yugoslav divides: the Croat

> spring 1971, Serbian action 1987-89, minority autonomy demands in

> Krajina/Slavonia, B-i-H and Kosovo/a; the fascism of ustashe and

> chetnik para-military forces. Atrocities were predictable.



> > [3] The failure to take seriously outside party histories, like

> Austria and Germany wanting revenge for the First and Second

> world wars and their loss of empire, possibly also Italy.



> > [4] The one-sided demonization of the Serbs, as the center of

> Evil in Yugoslavia, oblivious of where the shooting started (in

> Slovenia) and the blatant ethnic discrimination (in Croatia).



> > [5] The one-sided demonization of Milosevic, as the center of

> the Center of Evil, oblivious of the hardline nationalists Seselj

> and Arkan, also failing to understand Milosevic' appeal as a

> reaction to Titoist anti-Serbian policies, and his efforts to

> protect (like Saddam Hussein) some kind of welfare state.





> > [6] The failure to take Perez de Cuellar's warnings to Genscher

> seriously: no undue haste in recognition, protect minorities, no

> one-sided policies, have a policy for Yugoslavia as a whole, take

> time; indeed, the failure to make his views public at all.



> > [7] The failure to call a general Conference on Security and

> Cooperation in Southeast Europe as an alternative to a Contact

> Group of six heavily involved big powers with their own agendas.



> > [8] The failure to grant the parties in Yugoslavia "equal rights

> to self-determination"; for Slovenes and Croats, but also for the

> Serbs in Krajina/Slavonia; for Bosniaks, but also for Serbs and

> Croats in B-i-H; for Serbs retaining their US and OSCE membership

> but also for Hungarians in Vojvodina and Albanians in Kosovo/a;

> for Macedonians, but also for Albanians in Macedonia.



> > [9] The failure to think in terms of a Yugoslav confederation.

> With Montenegro as one entity equal self-determination leads to

> 12+ entities as opposed to 8 in the 1974 Yugoslav constitution,

> not a dramatic change and a very preferable alternative.



> > [10] The failure to take the religious dimension seriously; the

> conflict is not over theology, but religion serves to identify

> the parties across state borders and produces true believers.



> > [11] The failure to take the economic dimensions seriously; there

> debts to be collected and oil pipe lines to be built.



> > [12] The failure to take media manipulation seriously, like

> Hill&Knowlton, and Ruder Finn. No doubt there are others.

> >