http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa110142003
|
AI INDEX: ASA
11/014/2003 23 June 2003
|
|
Afghanistan
Out
of sight, out of mind:
The
fate of the Afghan returnees
"The Government
of Afghanistan has asked that repatriation should be respectful, gradual and
should take into account the absorption capacity of our country."
Afghanistan Minister of Refugees and Repatriation, Enayatullah Nazari, speaking
to Amnesty International delegates, 6 April 2003.
"We wish now we hadn't returned; if we had known the real situation
we wouldn't have come back."
Mohamed
Shah, recently returned from Iran to Kabul city. Interviewed by Amnesty
International in April 2003.
1. Introduction
1.1 Background
In Amnesty International's
view it is impossible to describe Afghanistan in 2003 as a country in a
post-conflict situation. This assessment, shared by others, has serious
implications for the voluntariness and sustainability of return of refugees and
asylum-seekers from neighbouring and non-neighbouring states to Afghanistan, as
well as for those returnees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) currently
residing within Afghanistan.(1) The total number of refugees and IDPs from and
in Afghanistan by the beginning of 2003 was over 3.5 million and 700,000
respectively.(2)
Continued factional
fighting among regional and local commanders, targeting of aid personnel, crime
and banditry, and the resurgence of forces allied to the Taleban, have resulted
in a situation of generalized instability in up to two-thirds of the country.
Regional and local commanders, including in the north, the west and the south
of the country, have continued to fight local "turf wars", leading in
many instances to the death of civilians, destruction of property, and fresh
displacement. On 11 June 2003, fighting between the forces of Abdul Rashid
Dostum and Ustad Atta Mohamed in Sholgara district, south of the city of
Mazar-i-Sharif, killed at least two civilians and wounded another. The security
situation across Afghanistan has steadily deteriorated in 2003, leading many
observers to fear for the long-term stability and reconstruction of the
country.
Urban areas, including Kabul, cannot be considered sufficiently secure or
stable to satisfy requirements of return in safety and dignity. In recent
months the capital city has been witness to armed attacks on International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) soldiers and compounds, bomb attacks, rocket
attacks and attacks against international non-governmental organisations (NGO)
personnel. On 7 June 2003, four German ISAF soldiers and one Afghan civilian
were killed and a large number of people were injured when a car bomb exploded
near a bus transporting ISAF soldiers to the Kabul airport.(3)
The Afghan Transitional Administration and the United States (US) have
prioritized the development of an Afghan National Army (ANA) that can provide
security for the country in a neutral manner, independent of political or
factional influence. However, recruitment and training remain in the early
stages and there are no clear indications of when and how the ANA will be able
to operate effectively in areas currently under the control of factional
militias. A three-year disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program
aimed at dismantling factional forces is only due to start on 1 July 2003.
The criminal justice system remains extremely weak and unable to effectively
protect basic human rights, particularly in areas outside Kabul. Police lack
professional skills and are often unable to work effectively due to shortage of
resources and local control of armed groups. The failure to provide adequate
salaries on a regular basis to police has also encouraged corruption and a
pattern of human rights violations linked to extortion by police.
There are widespread and massive violations of fair trial standards within the
formal court system. Most rural communities bring disputes, including criminal
matters, to local leaders or informal judicial bodies rather than the official
court system. Remedies imposed by informal judicial bodies or community leaders
regularly result in human rights abuses, notably the forced marriage of women
and girls as a practice of "exchange".
Women continue to face widespread discrimination. Although national policies
prohibiting female education and work have been lifted, communities and
families continue to place extreme restrictions on women and girl's activities,
behaviour and movement. Forced marriage is prevalent and many girls are married
at very young ages. In some areas, there have been reports that women and girls
have been abducted by armed groups.
A Constitutional Loya
Jirga (General Assembly) is scheduled to be held in September/October 2003
to discuss various draft constitutions submitted by the Constitutional Drafting
Sub-Commission following various processes of consultation. Under the terms of
the Bonn Agreement, a general election is to be held not later than June 2004.
The central government in Kabul has adopted a national development budget.
However, many of these developments are held hostage to a deteriorating
security situation and lack of sufficient international aid. Much of the
development budget, for instance, which contains provisions for the regularization
of informal settlements including some inhabited by IDPs and returnees, remains
unimplemented due to lack of funds. Should the security and human rights
situation remain the same by June 2004, the scheduled elections will not be
able to be held in a transparent, equitable and rights-respecting manner.
Amnesty International is
concerned that, under current conditions, the inability of many refugees and
IDPs to sustain their return to their places of origin or preferred destination
is leading to destitution and renewed cycles of displacement. This is being
exacerbated by the fact that many instances of return, of both IDPs and
refugees, are taking place in less than voluntary circumstances. The
sustainability of return is further hindered by insufficient aid and
reconstruction assistance from the international community.(4) The consequences
for the people of Afghanistan, including the refugees and asylum seekers who
have returned to that country, will be negative in the extreme if Afghanistan once
again drops off the international agenda as it did more than one decade ago.
Over the last year, Amnesty International has documented the fragility of the
post-Taleban "peace" as well as the ongoing human rights violations
that have resulted from continued insecurity, a climate of impunity and lack of
effective rule of law.(5)
1.2 Scope of this
report
For this report, in April
2003 Amnesty International delegates interviewed over 100 persons, who were
judged to represent the situation of up to 2,500 individuals. Interviews were
conducted in Kabul city and surrounding areas including the Shomali valley;
Mazar-i-Sharif city and environs; Balkh city; rural areas in Jawzjan province;
Kunduz city and environs; Khanabad district and Imamsahib district (both in
Kunduz province); Pul-i-Khumri and Dandeghori district in Baghlan province;
Herat city; and IDP camps in Herat province.(6)
Interviewees were at
various stages in the cycle of displacement and return. They included:
ˇ Refugees that had
returned from Iran in summer 2002
ˇ Refugees that had returned from Pakistan in the first months of 2003
ˇ IDPs living in formal camps in Herat province
ˇ IDPs informally settled in urban centres, such as Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif
ˇ Returnees from Pakistan and Iran who had been forced into situations of
internal displacement
ˇ Returned asylum seekers from non-neighbouring states
1.3 Map of Afghanistan
Š http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/
2. Pattern of displacement and return in 2003
Ismaili returnees from
Pakistan. They are now living in tents in Pul-i-Khumri, Baghlan province
because they have been forcibly prevented from reclaiming their land and
houses. ŠAI
Following the fall of the Taleban
government in December 2001, refugees began returning to Afghanistan from
neighbouring Pakistan and Iran and, in much smaller numbers, from
non-neighbouring states in which they had sought asylum. The United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that more than 2 million
refugees returned to Afghanistan, either spontaneously or through UNHCR
assisted programmes, from Pakistan and Iran in the course of 2002. In the same
period, up to 700,000 IDPs returned to their places of origin.
Due to the situation in
contemporary Afghanistan, it has been difficult to obtain accurate numbers of
returns to Afghanistan. What is clear, however, is that in stark contrast to
the sizeable return from neighbouring states in 2002, the numbers of people returning
to Afghanistan during spring 2003 were significantly lower, due in no small
part to the conviction of many refugees that they would be unable to return in
conditions of safety and dignity. UNHCR announced on 6 June 2003 that around
158,000 Afghan refugees had so far been assisted to return to their country of
origin during the first five months of 2003. Of these 115,000 had returned from
Pakistan, while 43,000 had come back from Iran.(7) In the same period in 2002,
UNHCR had assisted in the return of over 815,000 people.(8) The overwhelming
majority of these returns were from Pakistan and Iran, which in total continue
to host over 3 million Afghan refugees.(9) An estimated 650,000 IDPs remain
displaced inside Afghanistan. Around 25,000 IDPs returned to their places of
origin in the first five months of 2003. By the end of June 2002, in
comparison, around 400,000 IDPs had returned to their places of origin.(10)
While the fact of lower
returns so far this year has placed less strain on Afghanistan's already
overburdened infrastructure, it also indicates that the sustainability of the
large-scale returns of last year continues to be seriously open to question.
Amnesty International collected testimony from many returnees who repeatedly
reported that while they had made a "voluntary" decision to return,
had they been aware of the actual material and security conditions to which
they were returning, their decision would have been different. (11) As a UNHCR
spokeswoman noted recently, "Returning refugees say that more Afghan
families will return if security is improved, especially in the southern
provinces, and if there are more job prospects and reconstruction inside
Afghanistan."(12) This is further underlined by Amnesty International's
research and other reports, both in 2002 as well as this year, of scores of
people who have either turned around and left Afghanistan again once confronted
with an unsustainable return or, for similar reasons, ended up in situations of
internal displacement.(13) Reports of continued displacement of refugee
returnees in 2003 emanated from Kabul city as well as rural areas in the rest
of the country. IDPs, too, have been forced into a seemingly endless search for
refuge, having been unable to return to their places of origin.
Amnesty International is
concerned that large numbers of returns to a situation in which these returns
cannot be sustained will be detrimental both to the safety and human rights of
returnees as well as to the long-term reconstruction of Afghanistan. If refugees
are unable to sustain their return to their country of origin there is also an
increased likelihood, borne out by events in Afghanistan in 2002 and 2003, that
they will once again attempt to seek refuge in other countries. Ensuring the
sustainability of returns is, therefore, in the interests of the refugees
themselves, the country of origin, as well as countries of asylum, be they in
the immediate vicinity of the refugee-producing country or further a field.
3. Return from
neighbouring states - the issue of voluntariness
'We were
insulted a lot in Iran and harassed almost every day. Even if our children were
allowed education, they are not allowed to get jobs. Every day we were
psychologically and spiritually sick.'
Sayida,
Afghan refugee, who had just arrived in Herat from Mashad, Iran, interviewed by
Amnesty International in April 2003.
Since Karzai came into power, the police in Pakistan have increased
their harassment of Afghan refugees. I finally decided to bring my family back
to Afghanistan before the police took all our savings.
Mohammadin,
Afghan refugee who returned from Mirpur, Pakistan in summer 2002, interviewed
by Amnesty International in April 2003.
3.1. Introduction
Pakistan and Iran have
provided a place of refuge for up to 6 million Afghan refugees between them for
more than 20 years. This has been a significant effort and represents a major
contribution from these two developing countries; it has enabled the majority
of refugees fleeing persecution and generalized violence in Afghanistan to find
relative safety outside the country. However, and unfortunately, in recent
years there have been increasing signs that 'asylum fatigue' in Pakistan and
Iran has led to pressures on Afghan refugees to return, in contravention of
international human rights standards. Amnesty International has recorded
testimony from a number of returnees from Pakistan and Iran that documented
pressure from the authorities to return. This included police harassment,
arbitrary arrest and even outright deportation of Afghan refugees. In addition,
returnees often spoke of widespread public attitudes of hostility towards
Afghan refugees which, in many cases, influenced the decision to repatriate.
There is concern, too, that following the fall of the Taleban, assessments that
the situation in Afghanistan is now "safe" has led these countries to
attempt to keep their borders closed to Afghans fleeing persecution. In
addition, international aid and assistance to Pakistan and Iran to care for the
millions of refugees that still remain on their territories has decreased
sharply. Amnesty International has repeatedly expressed concern about this
failure of host country protection and international support.(14)
Pressure on Afghan refugees
by the neighbouring host states of Iran and Pakistan has often taken the form
of denial of their basic social and economic rights. In Iran, many Afghan
refugee children are denied access to regular schooling, and have been forced
instead to attend Afghan-run schools, which are illegal and therefore at risk
of closure, and often substandard. This was mentioned as one of the compelling
reasons for their decision to return by a number of returnee parents, including
Mohammed Ayub, who returned with his three children to Kabul in April 2003. Refugees
in Pakistan were denied access to adequate shelter, when local authorities
closed down sections of refugee camps forcing many to move to urban centres
where few could afford to rent suitable accommodation. Amnesty International is
of the view that in order to ensure that the return of refugees is truly
voluntary, host states, UNHCR and donor states should collectively guarantee
respect for the human rights of refugees, in particular that refugees retain
access to their basic social and economic rights in their countries of asylum.
"Inducing" the repatriation of refugees through denying them their
social and economic rights constitutes a breach of the principle of non-refoulement.(15)
A free and informed decision to repatriate must, inter alia, arise
out of a situation in the country of asylum which is sufficiently secure as to
permit free choice.
Many of the return
movements from Iran and Pakistan in 2002 and 2003 were not an act of free will
on the part of the refugees, who were constrained by explicit or implicit
pressures emanating from the local or national authorities.
3.2 Pakistan
The decision of the
government of Pakistan to close sections of camps in the North West Frontier
Province (NWFP), including Nasir Bagh, Jalozai and Kacha Garhi,(16) and issue
eviction orders for the residents of these camps forced thousands of refugees,
including many of those interviewed by Amnesty International, to move to the
urban areas of Pakistan in search of protection. The vast majority of returnees
from Pakistan in 2002 were "non-camp refugees" living in urban areas.
Amnesty International heard
from returnees in Afghanistan that police harassment of refugees, including in
Pakistan's cities, was one of the reasons many "chose" to return.
Ghulam Ali Mohammed, who returned to Khanabad district in northern Afghanistan
from Taxila, Pakistan in July 2002 testified how a few years ago the Pakistani
police had begun arbitrarily arresting Afghan refugees and demanding money for
their release. Abdul Sattar, who had eventually come to Kabul in July 2002 with
his family from the Kacha Garhi camp in Pakistan, stated that he returned
'mainly because of police harassment'. He was kept in jail for 17 days and had
to pay money to secure his release. Afghan refugees in Pakistan are routinely
detained by the police, often on mere "suspicion" of involvement in
criminal activity such as theft, and made to pay a "fine" to secure
their release.(17) Mohammedin returned from Kashmir, Pakistan with ten members
of his family in 2002. He stated that police harassment of Afghan refugees in
Kashmir had begun after the fall of the Taleban. His son Gulbadin had been
arrested on suspicion of theft, and held for 5 days; he was also beaten with
electricity cables. The family had to pay Rs. 1,500 for his release and decided
then that they had to return to avoid further abuse. Other returnees have
spoken of the police in Pakistan extorting their salaries from them on payday,
and using Afghan refugees as forced labour for private purposes while they were
in prison.
3.3 Iran
3.3.1 Human rights
abuses of Afghans in Iran
The picture of refugee
returns from Iran is even more disturbing. Almost every returnee from Iran that
Amnesty International interviewed spoke of a pervading atmosphere of hostility
directed at Afghan refugees by the Iranian authorities and public. Several
returnees and their children reported being the targets of verbal abuse and
being told to 'go back to Afghanistan, you are taking our jobs and you don't
belong here' following the fall of the Taleban. Afghan refugees are reportedly
arrested for traveling from one city to another without documentation, women
refugees are arrested for being behijabi (venturing out of the house
without wearing a veil), and employers are discouraged from hiring
refugees.(18) Abdul Ghaffar, who returned to Kabul in 2002, stated that his son
had been arrested twice by the Iranian police, and during the second period of
detention had been beaten while suspended from a ceiling fan. Several returnees
also spoke of hearing official reports in the Iranian media that every Afghan
refugee would be "expected" to return by the end of 2003.(19)
3.3.2 Forced returns
from Iran
More worrying still are
cases of forced returns from Iran that Amnesty International documented while
in Afghanistan. One national NGO estimated that as many as 25 percent of
refugee returns from Iran were forced.(20) Afghan refugees have been picked up
by the police, some for not having their documents on their person when
arrested. Others were removed from their homes, and placed in overcrowded
detention centres prior to being escorted to the border by the authorities.
Afghan refugees, including unaccompanied women and minors, are reportedly
detained without access to their family or, in some cases, without being
allowed to inform their relatives that they are about to be forcibly returned.
Amnesty International heard reports from women who were not allowed to contact
their husbands, who would have possession of their documents, and were then deported
on their own for being "undocumented". Amnesty International met one
elderly woman, around 85 years old, in the General Transit Centre near Herat
city who had been forcibly returned from Iran on her own and who did not have
any knowledge of whether she had any relatives in Afghanistan. Testimony from
other returnees indicates systematic threats by the Iranian authorities to
separate family members through deportation, in order to force the return of
the whole family. Seventy-seven year old Haider and his family of five left
Iran "voluntarily" in summer 2002 after being told by the police that
he would be deported separately if his entire family didn't all leave
immediately. Unaccompanied minors, too, have been deported from Iran. Shah Mohammed
and Mohammed Ali, both 12 years old, said they were imprisoned and beaten by
the police at the Zabul border, before being forcibly returned through the
Herat border post in March 2003.
4. Non-neighbouring
states - forced return and promotion of assisted returns
While Pakistan and Iran
bore the brunt of the refugee exodus from Afghanistan, many refugees also fled
to countries further a field, such as Australia, the United Kingdom (UK) and other
countries of the European Union, Russia, Indonesia and others. A smaller number
also went to states surrounding Afghanistan, such as Tajikistan and India. In
July 2002, Amnesty International expressed concern at the haste with which
several of these host states had indicated, explicitly or implicitly through
the adoption of measures intended to compel the return of refugees and asylum
seekers, that the situation in Afghanistan had changed to such an extent that
return was both possible and desirable. Accordingly, for instance, Amnesty
International criticized the fact that Australia had been taking "active
steps" to encourage the return of Afghan asylum seekers detained in
Australia or recognized refugees living there under temporary protection
arrangements.(21) In February 2002, the United Arab Emirates forcibly returned
over 1,000 Afghan refugees to Kabul. Afghan refugees have also been forcibly
returned from Tajikistan, including nine on 15 September 2002. According to
UNHCR, these nine refugees were separated from their families and detained
prior to their deportation.(22) Another high profile forced return was from the
UK on 28 April 2003, when 21 male rejected asylum-seekers were returned to
Kabul. This was followed by a second chartered flight on 20 May carrying 34
asylum-seekers from the UK and four from France.(23)
Amnesty International urges
non-neighbouring states hosting Afghan refugees, especially industrialized
states including in the European Union and Australia, to be aware that the
forced return of refugees or rejected asylum seekers from their territory sends
out the misleading message to developing states hosting far larger numbers of
Afghans, that return to Afghanistan should be promoted. Such 'symbolic'
returns, in the current circumstances, will in most cases be detrimental to the
long-term future of Afghanistan, to the safety and dignity of returning
individuals, as well as protection of the rights and needs of those wishing to
remain in the country of asylum.
States hosting Afghan refugees,
including the UK, Australia and Denmark, have also instituted "incentives
programmes" in order to induce the "voluntary repatriation" of
these refugees. Such incentives include financial awards as well as free
transport to Afghanistan. However, at the time of writing, a mere 39 people
have so far taken advantage of the programme run by the UK government.
Incentive schemes which might themselves amount to forcible or coercive
measures are a violation of the principle of non-refoulement. In
addition, incentive schemes which penalize in any way refugees that do not take
advantage of them, could be considered in themselves to constitute a
"promotion" (as opposed to a facilitation) of repatriation. Voluntary
repatriation should not be seen as "the only" solution, even when
Afghanistan reaches a post-conflict stage. All durable solutions, including
local integration and resettlement, must remain reasonably available to
refugees from Afghanistan, no matter where they are located.(24) States must be
guided by the individual protection concerns of the refugees on their
territory, and must consider the most appropriate durable solution for each
refugee, including women and children, on an individual basis. In addition,
those asylum seekers must be able to choose freely whether they pursue their
asylum claims. To this end they must continue to have access to a fair,
satisfactory and individual asylum determination procedure in the host country,
including independent appeal procedures.
Forced returns from the
UK
Amnesty International has
expressed its strong concern about the forced return of rejected asylum seekers
from the UK, the first flight of which left for Kabul on 28 April 2003. Several
of the 21 rejected asylum seekers were later interviewed by Amnesty International's
representatives. They reported that their return was chaotic and the returning
authorities had paid insufficient attention to reintegration assistance and
post-return monitoring. Amnesty International does not agree with the claim of
the UK authorities that forced returns to Afghanistan, even if "only"
to Kabul city, are sustainable or that they uphold the basic human rights,
including the economic, social and cultural rights, of these returnees.
Three Sikh asylum seekers,
who were forcibly returned by the UK, were forced to seek shelter in a Sikh
temple in Kabul as they had nowhere else to go. Two of them were originally
from Jalalabad but had no idea whether they had any relatives still left in
that city and so were reluctant to return. Yet, they also felt vulnerable as
potential targets of persecution in Kabul as the majority of the Afghan Sikh
population has not returned to that city. Three days after their return, they
reported that they had been singled out for abuse in a market place in Kabul.
Other returnees spoke of
the fact that they too had no place of shelter in Kabul. Abdul, a Tajik from
Panjshir, said he was going to stay in Kabul because there was nothing for him
to go back to in his home village. He did not, however, have any idea how or
where to find a job. Akim, a Pashtun from Jalalabad, said he could not return
to Jalalabad as he had borrowed a lot of money in order to finance his flight
from Afghanistan, and so feared for his safety. Some expressed their
determination to leave for Pakistan as soon as possible in order to search for
employment.
The international community appears to have washed its hands of the
responsibility of monitoring the return of these asylum seekers. The Ministry
of Refugees and Repatriation is overwhelmed and unable in most cases to provide
post-return reintegration information and assistance. The Minister for Refugees
and Repatriation has frequently urged host countries to be patient, and to hold
back on the return, in particular forcible return, of Afghan refugees until
progress is made with the rehabilitation process in Afghanistan.
Amnesty International notes that returns that take place in the absence of
sufficient and effective attention to the safety and dignity of returnees are
unlikely to be sustainable. This attention must also be given during the period
of transit, and does not end at the moment someone touches down on the
territory. A safe and indeed dignified return must, inter alia, take
into consideration an individual's right to protection from persecution, as
well as such rights as the right to adequate shelter and of access to
employment.
5. IDPs - voluntariness
of return and forced return
"My
husband is very ill; every few days he has to go to the clinic and so can't go
to the city to find work. I make wool to feed my family but it is very
difficult. I manage sometimes to buy bread from the bazaar but nothing else. I
also have to look after my sister-in-law and her three children whose husband
has disappeared. We think maybe he has gone to Iran to look for work."
Rahkiya,
a 40 year old woman from Ghor province, living in Maslakh IDP camp outside
Herat City. Interviewed by Amnesty International in April 2003.
5.1 Cycles of displacement
For many of the estimated
600,000 IDPs in Afghanistan, return to their homes or places of origin remains
a distant dream. IDPs in Kabul city, in the north and in the west of the
country are either unable or unwilling to return. In addition, there are large
groups of, mainly Pashtun and Kutchi IDPs in southern provinces that are
similarly unable to return to their homes in the north.(25) UNHCR has noted
that "many of the reasons that have caused people to become internally
displaced in Afghanistan are similar to those that have resulted in them seeking
refuge abroad. In the same vein, many of the solutions to internal displacement
are similar to those for refugees."(26) To this could be added the fact
that many refugee returnees have been forced into a situation of internal
displacement upon their return to Afghanistan and, therefore, are still in
search of a durable solution to their displacement. Amnesty International
interviewed a group of Ismaili IDPs originally from Doshi district, Baghlan
province, who had returned from Pakistan in 2002 only to find their land
occupied by people from a rival ethnic group. Having been prevented by threats
of violence from reclaiming their land, the Ismailis have been forced to set up
informal settlements on government-owned land in Pul-i-Khumri.
5.2 Forced return?
The precipitate return of
IDPs to their villages of origin in Afghanistan raises similar questions of
sustainability to those posed in relation to the return of refugees, and
carries with it the same dangers to the security and human rights protection of
the persons returning, as well as negative implications for the reconstruction
of the country. Some groups of IDPs interviewed by Amnesty International stated
that they had been forced to become internally displaced because they had been
unable to raise enough funds to travel to another country. This was the case
with a group of Pashtun IDPs originally from Takhar, who told Amnesty
International that they had come to seek refuge in Kunduz in early 2002
because, unlike other families from their village, they had been unable to
afford the trip to Pakistan to escape persecution at the hands of the local
commander. In 2003, people continue to be displaced within Afghanistan, and to
attempt to leave the country to seek refuge elsewhere.
5.3 Human rights
standards for the internally displaced
The main causes of
displacement for many of the IDPS appear to have been ongoing protection
concerns in their places of origin, and socio-economic motives mainly relating
to the five year drought, which affected large parts of Afghanistan between
1997 and 2002, and which is still ongoing in some parts of the south. The
authoritative guiding standards on the protection of IDPs, known as the Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement and based on human rights and humanitarian
law standards and refugee law by analogy, provide that IDPs have "the
right to seek safety in another part of the country" and "the right
to be protected against forcible return to or resettlement in any place where
their life, safety, liberty and/or health would be at risk."(27) Such
'forcible return' includes measures that, by violating the basic social and
economic rights of IDPs, have the effect of forcing people to return. Amnesty
International is concerned that IDPs are being compelled to return to their
villages or places of origin because they are unable to find employment and, in
some cases, do not have access to food. One result of this is that child labour
among IDPs is commonplace. A man in Shaidayee camp told Amnesty International
that his family relied on his sons, aged between three and a half and 12, to
make carpets for the family's survival. Where IDPs are dependent on assistance,
such as in camps run by national authorities and the international community,
the effects of measures which violate basic social and economic rights are more
pronounced.
6. UNHCR and the
international community - facilitating or promoting return?
In Amnesty International's
interviews with refugee returnees who had come back from Iran and Pakistan in
2002, the most commonly expressed sentiment of the return was that 'we wish now
we hadn't returned; if we had known the real situation we wouldn't have come
back.' Returnees such as Ali Mohammed, living in the ruins of the former
Russian Cultural Centre in Kabul city with his wife and eight children alleged
that life was better for them in Pakistan, because at the very least they had
electricity, gas and a decent roof over their heads. Zainab, who shared a tent
on the outskirts of Kabul with seven members of her family, stated that they
had returned because of announcements by the Afghan Transitional Administration
that the situation had improved in Afghanistan and that they would get money
and jobs when they came back, but they had returned to a life of destitution.
UNHCR has stated on a
number of occasions in relation to Afghanistan that it is still facilitating
rather than promoting repatriation. The conceptual difference between these two
terms is relatively precise. In its Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation, UNHCR
notes that it may
"facilitate
voluntary repatriation when refugees indicate a strong desire to return
voluntarily and/or have begun to do so on their own initiative, even where
UNHCR does not consider that, objectively, it is safe for most refugees to
return."
In stark contrast,
"promotion
of [voluntary] repatriation can take place when a careful assessment of the
situation shows that the conditions of "safety and dignity" can be
met: in other words, when it appears that objectively it is safe for most
refugees to return and that such returns have good prospects of being
durable."(28)
The fact that UNHCR continues to facilitate, and not
promote voluntary repatriation to Afghanistan is significant, in that in doing
so the refugee agency acknowledges that the situation in Afghanistan is neither
"objectively safe" for the return of most refugees, nor in its
estimation are most returns likely to be durable.
It is also apparent from
the Handbook that the distinction between the two terms is rooted in an
objective analysis of sustainability, and UNHCR must reflect this conceptual
difference in its practice. Actions which have the effect of promoting
repatriation should not be undertaken under the guise of merely
"facilitating" this return. In this context, Amnesty International is
concerned that UNHCR's "planning figures" for returns from Pakistan
(600,000), Iran (500,000) and other countries (100,000) in 2003 could be taken
by host countries instead to represent "repatriation targets", with
extremely negative consequences for Afghan refugees and asylum seekers in these
countries.
In examining the elements
of a voluntary repatriation, consideration should be given to the entire range
of information provided to a refugee that has influenced her decision to
return. Truly voluntary return is an informed decision; by which is meant that
the returnee has been given unimpeded access to "objective, accurate and
neutral" information.(29) In 2002, as the first movements of the massive
"spontaneous" repatriation got underway, it became apparent that
there were several voices clamouring for refugees' attention in neighbouring
host countries. Refugees were told that the new Afghan government and the
international community (in the form of ISAF, which only operates in Kabul city
and immediate environs) would provide security and economic opportunities for
returnees. This atmosphere of heightened expectations was bolstered in the
minds of several refugees by the "voluntary assisted repatriation"
programme of UNHCR, which was registering and providing return assistance to
those that had "decided" to return. A recent report by an independent
think-tank has noted that the UNHCR cash grant and assistance package
"surely sent out a powerful message that, in the opinion of the UN and of
the international community generally, now was the time to go 'home'".(30)
Amnesty International is of
the opinion that, in "supporting refugee decision-making" in relation
to return, UNHCR should be mindful of the reinforcing effect its attempts to
facilitate repatriation can have on the making of these decisions.(31) Many
refugees and IDPs interviewed by Amnesty International said they did not have
access to objective, accurate and neutral information on the conditions to
which they were returning in their villages or places of origin. Amnesty
International interviewed a group of Uzbek villagers, who had fled to Pakistan
to escape the persecution of Turkmen Taleban in their native Imansahib
district, and who then returned in August 2002 unaware that the same group of
Turkmen, now allied to the Jamiat-e-Islami faction, were still in
control of the village and of their land. The Turkmen continue to threaten the
Uzbeks, who are now forced to live in ruined buildings on the outskirts of the
village, and are still denied access to their land. In another case, returnees
at the brink of destitution in Kabul said they were unaware, at the time they
made the decision to return to Afghanistan from Pakistan, that the assistance
from UNHCR would not be continued once they had arrived in their country of
origin.(32) Many displaced women have also not been given accurate and
impartial information, provided to them in a manner which is accessible and
culturally-sensitive, in order to be able to make an independent decision on return.
Where it considers that
conditions for a safe, dignified and durable return are not present, UNHCR
should intercede strongly with asylum countries who, explicitly or implicitly, are
encouraging or forcing the return of refugees and asylum seekers to an
unsustainable situation in their country of origin. Thus far UNHCR has not been
a sufficiently strong and vocal advocate for the right of Afghan refugees and
asylum seekers, whether living in neighbouring countries or countries outside
the region, not to be returned to an unsustainable situation.
Returnees often arrived in
Afghanistan with little more than enthusiasm for a new Afghanistan and a bright
future, but were unaware of the fact that this future would, if at all, not be
achievable for years. Amnesty International continues to urge host countries to
support the institution of "go and see" or "go and work"
visits for refugees resident on their territory in order that the refugee might
be able to assess for herself the sustainability of any return to her country
of origin. Individuals and families making such visits should be able to do so
without prejudice to their continuing right to protection in their country of
asylum.(33) In the complex and volatile circumstances of contemporary
Afghanistan, this will give Afghan refugees the security and ability to make an
informed and truly voluntary decision to return, a decision which is more
likely to be sustainable than one made in an information vacuum.
7. Obstacles to
sustainable return
'We will have
to use all the money we saved in Iran just to get to Kabul; we don't have a
house or even land once we get there, so what money will we then use to
survive?'
Shaquila,
just arrived at the General Transit Centre in Herat, interviewed by Amnesty
International in April 2003
'The moment someone helps me rebuild my house, I will take my family
back immediately.'
Abdul
Rahim, a returnee from Pakistan squatting with his family in a ruined building
in Kabul, on why he cannot return to his land in Panjshir. His house was
destroyed during the civil war. He was interviewed by Amnesty International in
April 2003.
7.1 The importance of sustainability
A return that is not truly voluntary,
or a return that takes place as a result of inadequate or inaccurate
information, is likely to be unsustainable. The sustainability of returns, both
for refugees as well as IDPs, has consequences for the security and human
rights protection of the returnee as well as broader consequences for the
rehabilitation of the country of origin. Sustainability is linked both to the
security situation of the area to which refugees and IDPs would return, as well
as to the absorption capacity of that area.
Refugees choose to return
to their country of origin for a number of reasons. These include civil and
political rights considerations, such as an absence of persecution, as well as
the likelihood that they would enjoy economic, social and cultural rights, such
as access to adequate shelter. There are rational reasons for this, as refugees
know only too well that the conflict, and their subsequent displacement, was
often caused or fuelled by economic, social and cultural insecurity,
differences and disparities. These rights are necessarily interdependent and,
in the context of a sustainable return, their presence in an enduring sense is
more likely to lead to a return which will be sustainable. This chapter will
list a number of key issues that are crucial to a rights-respecting and thus
sustainable return.
7.2 Security
Afghanistan is a country still in turmoil and scarred by decades of
conflict. ŠAI
7.2.1 Continued
fighting and the legacy of conflict
Amnesty International
believes that Afghanistan is not a country that has crossed over into a
post-conflict situation, and therefore is one to which most refugee and IDP
returns should be considered unsustainable. At a basic minimum, a post-conflict
situation would be characterized by adequate levels of security in the majority
of the country, access to adequate shelter, access to food and potable water,
access to employment, the rule of law and due regard for the human rights of
all persons, including in particular those of vulnerable groups. In
contemporary Afghanistan, these conditions are not being met for the vast
majority of Afghans, including refugees returning to their country of origin
who are especially vulnerable, having been uprooted for protracted periods of
time.
The security situation in
Afghanistan has steadily deteriorated in 2003. Attacks targeted at foreigners,
such as the murder of an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) staff
member in Uruzgan province in March 2003, have led to a withdrawal of NGO and
UN staff, in particular international staff, from aid projects throughout the
south of the country. Humanitarian aid workers and de-mining teams have also
been the target of attacks in other parts of the country. (34) Growing
insecurity over the last months has meant that up to two-thirds of the country
is not readily accessible to international aid agencies to conduct relief and
monitoring exercises. UN agencies in the south have recently had to request
armed escorts in order to be able to travel with some measure of security.
This insecurity is as
prevalent in the urban centres of Afghanistan as it is in the countryside. As
the pace of reconstruction in Afghanistan slows, and the living conditions of
most ordinary Afghans fails to improve, many are turning to extremist forces,
such as a revitalized Taleban now active in the south-east and east, to express
their disappointment in the present administration and its foreign backers.
US-led military action along Afghanistan's border with Pakistan has been the
cause of further deaths and consequent resentment of the presence of
foreigners. On 9 April, eleven civilians, including seven women, were killed
when a US bomb hit their house on the outskirts of Shikin, Paktika province. In
Kabul there has been a sharp decrease in the level of security experienced by
Afghans and members of the international community.(35)
There has also been an
upsurge in factional fighting amongst rival regional and local commanders
across Afghanistan. In early April, fighting between the forces of Abdul Rashid
Dostum and Ustad Atta Mohammed in Maimana city, Faryab province, killed up to
eight civilians. In Imamsahib district of Kunduz, a group of Uzbek returnees
from Pakistan complained that local Turkmen militia allied to the Jamiat-e-Islami
faction had kidnapped eight people, including five women, in order to force the
community to give up their land. Processes of disarmament and demobilization
have to date been largely ineffectual.
Between 5 and 10 million
landmines and unexploded ordinances continue to litter the countryside, killing
an estimated 200 persons every month. The Special Representative of the
Secretary General in Afghanistan noted recently that "The issue of
security in Afghanistan cast a long shadow over the whole peace process there
and, indeed, over the whole future of the country."(36) Furthermore,
public confidence in the police, including in Kabul, is very low, with the
police being responsible for human rights abuses including torture and
arbitrary detention.(37)
7.2.2 Security en
route
The security situation
encountered by many returnees on the road to their place of origin or preferred
destination is very precarious. Less than 10 percent of Afghanistan's road
infrastructure is paved, which has meant that much of the road system is prone
to flooding and often impassable during periods of rain. Much of Ghor province
in the west of the country was unreachable for this reason during early 2003,
and there were frequent reports of fatalities involving vehicles carrying
returning refugees and IDPs being washed off the dirt track roads.
Amnesty International has
also received reports of IDPs ending up in renewed displacement because of
their inability to reach their villages/places of origin. In one case, a group
of IDPs were forced to remain displaced within an informal settlement in
Chaghcharan city, a main urban centre in Ghor province. They had been
transported up to this point by the International Organization for Migration
(IOM) but had then been unable to make their way to their villages due to the
terrible road conditions.
Many of the roads in
Afghanistan are also fertile hunting grounds for gangs of bandits. Amnesty
International was told of returnees who had been attacked and robbed of their
reintegration packages in Ghazni while en route from Pakistan.
Several returnees also told
Amnesty International that the cash grant provided to them by UNHCR to pay for
their transport was inadequate. Mariam, who had just arrived at the General
Transit Centre in Herat, said that her family of six were unable to find a
truck that was willing to transport them to Kabul for the amount of money they
had received from UNHCR. Bilkis, who had come to Mazar-i-Sharif from Quetta in
July 2002, claimed that her family had had to sell the UNHCR reintegration
package in order to organize transport to their home in the north from Kabul.
7.2.3 Security
"at home" and its price
Most returnees and IDPs
interviewed by Amnesty International had been negatively affected by the
deteriorating security situation, which has drastically reduced the
sustainability of return, and in some cases has caused renewed displacement. As
the fighting continues and escalates, more people are leaving their homes in
search of security, either within Afghanistan or to neighbouring countries. In
Archi district in Kunduz, 12 returnee families had returned to Pakistan in
February 2003, complaining about the policies of exploitation of local
commanders.
Returnees are also subject to
illegal taxation by local commanders upon their return to their villages of
origin.(38) This is now rife in many areas of the north, where such taxation
often takes the form of a proportion of the UNHCR reintegration package.
The precarious security situation
had a far reaching impact on the protection concerns of returnees, furthering
affecting the sustainability of return. In the north of the country, local
commanders are forcibly recruiting men and boys to participate in the
internecine fighting. The local representative of the Ministry of Refugees and
Repatriation in Jawzjan province alleged that as many as 2000 families had left
Afghanistan in recent months following attempts by the rival Jamiat-e Islami
and Jonbesh-e Melli Islami factions to forcibly recruit men and boys.
Other families had been compelled to send their sons away, most often to Iran
and Pakistan, to escape forced recruitment. Still others have been forced to
sell their houses in order to pay the local commander not to recruit their sons.
Another protection concern
is the prevalence of forced and premature marriages of girls in order to
receive dowry. In Badakshaukat IDP camp outside Kunduz city, Amnesty
International was told of two families that were forced to sell their
daughters, aged 4 and 7 years, into marriage. One returnee in Kabul also told
Amnesty International of having to sell one child in the last months of 2002 in
order for the rest of the family to survive through the winter.
7.2.4 ISAF and security
in Kabul
While Kabul has achieved
some measure of security in the last few months relative to the rest of the
country, there are still areas of the city, such as western Kabul, where
security is precarious. ISAF, comprising 4,800 soldiers and based exclusively
in Kabul, is able to provide some measure of security to Kabul's inhabitants,
but this is largely the result of the "ISAF effect", where the mere
presence of international soldiers is sufficient to deter some crime and
lawlessness. ISAF is mandated to intervene on behalf of the government and to
help the government ensure law and order in Kabul city.
However, ISAF is not a
peace keeping force and has no mandate to intervene in relation to human rights
violations without a request from the government. Consequently, police
harassment and excessive use of force against civilians, violence against
unaccompanied and destitute women and petty crimes do not come within ISAF's
remit. Hazara returnees, many of whom have come back to live in western Kabul,
are often targets of violence and petty crime in that area, some of which is
carried out by rival ethnic groups, but allege that the police usually make no
attempt to investigate their complaints. Many unaccompanied returnee women have
been forced to beg on the streets of Kabul as their only means of survival, and
Amnesty International has received reports of verbal and physical harassment of
women returnees.
7.3 Employment
7.3.1 The changing
job market
Another very common
obstacle to sustainable return is the lack of access to employment for the vast
majority of returnees. Most of the returnees interviewed by Amnesty
International asserted that they had been unable to find jobs in an overcrowded
job market. Akim, crippled in his right arm, explained that he had been unable
to find a job since returning from Pakistan in the summer of 2002. Others spoke
of having been forced to take jobs that were not commensurate with their skills
level. Abdul Maram, who was employed as a driver in Pakistan, is engaged in
manual labour as this is the only job he can find to feed his family in Kabul.
Sharecroppers returning to
the land on which they had worked previously have found that the landlord had
employed other labourers in their absence. Due to the fact that there is less
land being cultivated in Afghanistan at the moment, on account of the drought
as well as persistent insecurity, returnee sharecroppers have in many cases
been forced to move to IDP camps or to urban centres in search of alternative
employment.
7.3.2 Unaccompanied
women and female-headed households
Unaccompanied women and
female-headed households have found it particularly hard to eke out a living
upon their return. Farah returned to Mazar-i-Sharif in February 2003 along with
her four children. Her husband was dead, and she was finding it very hard to
support her children with the little money she got from doing odd jobs such as
sewing. A group of Hazara women living as IDPs on the outskirts of
Mazar-i-Sharif stated that their husbands had very insecure access to wage labour
in the city, as a consequence of which they were unsure whether they would have
enough money to buy food for the family from one day to the next.
Situations of vulnerability
are heightened when, as is the case with several families in contemporary
Afghanistan, one man is the sole supporter of up to five female-headed
households. These are usually female relatives whose husbands have either died
or gone missing (most of the latter have lost contact with their families after
having gone in search of employment). The access of one man to employment,
therefore, in many cases has a direct bearing on the security and well being of
several women and their children.
7.4 Housing
Syed Kharam, an Ismaili
living in an informal settlement in Pul-I-Khumri, found upon his return to his
home village in Doshi district that his house had been occupied by Tajik
villagers. Threatened with violence by the Tajiks if they tried to reclaim
their property, Syed Kharam and his community were forced into a situation of
internal displacement in another district of Baghlan province.
A group of Gujar IDPs in
Badakshaukat camp also cannot return to their home village because their land
and animals have been appropriated by supporters of the local Jamiat-e Islami commander.
Lack of access to adequate
housing is a serious obstacle to sustainable return. Disputes over land and
property ownership proliferate in Afghanistan today, and returnees tend
disproportionately to be affected. Many returnees Amnesty International spoke
to have arrived back at their places of origin to find their land and/or houses
occupied by other families, often with the backing of powerful local
commanders. Others have been unable to raise the capital required in order to
rebuild houses on their land.
While some returnees
Amnesty International spoke with have taken their disputes to the courts, it is
also apparent that the process of resolving such disputes is skeletal at best.
The rule of law remains elusive, and dispute settlement mechanisms are
cumbersome and slow, leaving returnees in a position of heightened
vulnerability, as in many cases their ties to the local community have weakened
as a result of their absence.
Unaccompanied women, in
particular, often find themselves unable to access their land upon their
return. UNHCR has documented at least one case of a widow returning to
Afghanistan and, despite being in possession of documents of ownership, being
denied access to her land by the traditional leadership of her village.(39)
Women are often denied access to traditional leaders, or even formal justice
mechanisms, and can be severely disadvantaged in the absence of a male family
member who is willing to plead the case on behalf of the female relative.
Access to adequate shelter
is often a key element in sustainable return. Amnesty International was told by
some returnees that the main reason they had returned was to ensure they did
not miss out on shelter rebuilding projects. Kokogul and her husband Rahim Khan
returned from Karachi to the Shomali Valley in August 2002 when they heard that
an international NGO would help them rebuild a house on their land. Similarly,
Mohammed Azim came back from Pakistan to Jawzjan province when he heard that
UNHCR would help him rebuild his house. However, even these "success
stories" demonstrate the interdependence of the rights which are all
essential to sustainable return. Kokogul's husband is unemployed and the family
is finding it very difficult to survive economically. There is only one
hospital in the valley, and most people have only sporadic access to
healthcare. In Jawzjan, Mohammed Azim's relatives had had to send their son
back to Pakistan to protect him from forced recruitment.
7.5 Landlessness
7.5.1 Lack of land
leading to renewed displacement
Another problem related to
return to Afghanistan is that of landlessness. In 2002, UNHCR stated that 74.3
percent of returnees do not have farmland to which they can return.(40) A
recent report noted in addition, "it may be assumed that a 'significant'
number of returnees did not own land, surviving as workers, tenants, or
sharecroppers in varying degrees of dependency to landowners. They left the
country landless and may return landless."(41) In interviews with
returnees and IDPs, Amnesty International was repeatedly confronted with
evidence of landless returnees being forced into situations of either
destitution or internal displacement. One local NGO told Amnesty International
that several returnees in the Bamiyan region had been forced to move into caves
in the area as they had no where else to live.
7.5.2 Landless
returnees
Amnesty International also
spoke to returnees in Kabul city who had returned to the city as they owned no
land elsewhere in Afghanistan, and hoped to be able to earn a living in the
capital.(42) Being unable to afford to rent a room or a house due to spiraling
rent prices, however, many have been forced to move into dilapidated buildings
or unoccupied land. This was what had happened to Kamaluddin and ten members of
his family, who live in one room in the ruined Russian Cultural Centre in Kabul
city. "I have no other place to live", he said, "we sold our
land five years ago when we left Panjshir to seek refuge in Badakhshan."
The majority of these
families in Kabul live under the constant, and increasingly threatening, shadow
of eviction by the landowners. Of the returnees Amnesty International
interviewed in Kabul, many were squatting on government owned land and had
recently been issued with eviction orders. Around 60 returnee families who had
moved into the premises of a ruined shoe factory in western Kabul have been
evicted by the authorities, forcing them to set up tents on the surrounding
hillside.
Landless returnees cannot,
in addition, benefit from shelter projects run by various international agencies,
including UNHCR, which stipulate that the returnee must either own a title to
the land, or be able to get his community to vouch for his ownership of the
land before the agency will assist with rebuilding shelter on this land.
Obviously, such projects are of no help to the landless. This is the reason one
woman, Fariba, is unable to return to her place of origin in the Shomali valley
from Kabul city, where she is living in an informal tented settlement on
government land. While many international agencies are involved in helping
returnees to rebuild their houses in Shomali, Fariba and her family, despite
originating from the Shomali valley, are unable to benefit from this assistance
and thus to return "home", as they do not own any land in the valley
on which to build a house.
A group of 15 Uzbek
families returned from Pakistan to Kunduz city in August 2002. Being landless
and unable to afford rents in the city, they had set up tents on government
land just outside Kunduz, but were forced to move away by villagers who claimed
to own the land. They now reside in tents 50 metres away from their original
location. Amnesty International has learned that the provincial government
plans to redistribute this land to government employees, which will almost inevitably
lead to another displacement for these families.
7. 6 Education
Lack of access to education
constitutes a serious obstacle to sustainable return. Several of the returnee
children interviewed by Amnesty International had only limited access to education.
While some informally settled families have been able to secure educational
opportunities for their children, not one child in an informal tented
settlement in Kabul comprised of 75 families was receiving formal education.
Children are often denied access to education because they are required to
supplement the meager income of their family through employment. Mirza Ahmed's
eight children, who live with him in Kabul city following their return from
Quetta, do not go to school. Instead they wash cars, sell plastic bags and
trinkets in the street or work as manual labourers to earn money for their
family.
Secondary schools for girls
are limited, especially in rural areas. Girls living with their families in a
ruined building in western Kabul were unable to continue the education they had
started to receive while in exile. Saida's two teenage daughters, living in
their newly rebuilt house in the Shomali valley after their return from Iran,
told us that they could not go to school, as their father believed that it was
unsafe for them to walk to the nearest secondary school some kilometers away.
Ironically, the desire to
ensure an education for their children is cited as one of the main reasons for
many refugees to return to Afghanistan from Iran.
8. Assistance to
returnees and IDPs and protection monitoring
8.1 Assistance and
monitoring - late and ad hoc
The most serious obstacle
to adequate assistance to returnees and IDPs, and also to the conduct of
comprehensive and effective monitoring of returnees, is the perilous security
situation that exists across Afghanistan today. While Amnesty International
delegates were in the north of the country every single province in the
northern region was under UN travel restrictions due to the security situation.
UN activities are currently suspended in Uruzgan, Zabul and northern Hilmand
provinces, and both UN and NGO presence is limited also in southern Hilmand and
parts of Kandahar province. By severely restricting the movement of UN staff,
especially international staff, this has the effect of rendering monitoring of
returnees ad hoc and extremely limited to those areas that are secure
for aid agencies. Refugee and IDP returnees who have returned to their places
of origin lying outside these areas are likely, therefore, not to have their
post-return protection and assistance needs assessed either at all or until it
is too late and another cycle of displacement has begun. Much of the monitoring
instituted by UNHCR in Afghanistan effectively did not begin before October or
November 2002. Given that the large returns from neighbouring countries took
place in the summer of 2002, there are concerns that the monitoring exercises
missed the immediate protection concerns of many of the returnees. One
humanitarian agency in Kabul told Amnesty International that the lack of
systematic monitoring, especially in rural and remote areas, has meant that
contact on protection and assistance issues between returnees and international
agencies such as UNHCR tends to be ad hoc and often little more than a
matter of chance.
Returnee monitoring that
pays specific attention to the post-return needs and protection issues of women
is another area in which monitoring to date has been largely inadequate. An
inability to recruit sufficient national women staff has rendered many
monitoring missions simply unable to gain access to women in the communities
they have gone to monitor. Inadequate monitoring results in a situation where
relevant agencies and the international community lack comprehensive
information as to the actual post-return conditions for refugees and IDPs, and
thus on the sustainability of return and likelihood of further displacement.
Women also usually have very limited access to traditional leadership, such as
the shura (traditional village council), which many agencies turn to for
the selection of beneficiaries for various post-return assistance activities
such as shelter projects and cash-for-work schemes.
8.2 Lack of
monitoring and assistance in urban areas
Amnesty International is
concerned about the decision taken by UNHCR, among other agencies, not to
actively monitor and, in most cases, assist returnees in urban areas. During
the return movements in 2002, UNHCR reported that the majority of returnees
went back to urban areas.(43) It is almost certain that this trend is being
repeated in the returns taking place in 2003. Despite this fact, however, UNHCR
only started a very limited post-return monitoring programme in some urban
centres in spring 2003, and provides no reintegration assistance at all. As
this report has noted previously, it is not possible to substantiate the
assumption held by many that all returnees to urban centres find themselves
secure and able to sustain this return. Lack of access to employment, to adequate
shelter given the depleted housing stock of many cities including Kabul, and to
security for many vulnerable groups including female headed households and
unaccompanied women, has meant that urban centres can be as treacherous for
returnees as rural areas. Returnees are often forced to occupy deserted
buildings and land, often living in very poor and sometimes dangerous
conditions. Amnesty International was told of more than one case of children
suffering fatal falls from unprotected ledges in dilapidated buildings housing
returnee families.
The absorption capacity of
urban centres is also reaching its limit in many areas, and particularly in
Kabul. Refugees, IDPs and rejected asylum seekers are "returning" to
Kabul (even though this might not have been the place they left when forced
into flight) in search of material, physical and sometimes legal protection.
Mirza, who came to Kabul from Quetta, Pakistan with his family in July 2002,
originates from Logar province in central Afghanistan. "There is no work
in the countryside", he told Amnesty International, "I had to come to
Kabul to provide food for my family." Agencies estimate that more than
half a million returnees settled in Kabul in 2002.(44) In many respects this is
making a 'ticking bomb' out of the capital, which is already seeing a rise in
incidents of crime, overcrowding and violence against women.
On the question of support
to returnees in urban centres, Amnesty International was referred by UNHCR to
UN-HABITAT. UN-HABITAT informed Amnesty International in April 2003 that it
operated limited shelter assistance programmes for returnees and IDPs in only
four urban centres (Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar and Mazar-i-Sharif) and has been
unable to access lists of returnees from UNHCR in order to accurately target
assistance to the most vulnerable. Most returnees Amnesty International
interviewed in Kabul said that they had only received sporadic winterization
assistance, with some noting that this assistance had arrived as late as
February 2003. Najma, who had returned from Pakistan in the summer of 2002 and
now lives with seven members of her family in a tent on the outskirts of Kabul,
said that they had "spent a very hard winter here. The tents were frozen,
and many of our children became ill from sleeping on the damp floor."
Many donors have stipulated
that international agencies, including UNHCR, restrict their assistance
activities to the rural areas, at least partially to avoid a "pull
factor" to the cities. There are, however, obvious concerns about policies
that avoid the unavoidable reality of urbanization in a country as insecure and
devastated as Afghanistan. Returnees, including the landless, that have made a
rational decision to return to urban centres in the hope of sustaining their return
through access to security, employment and shelter should not be penalized by
being denied access to basic reintegration assistance and services, including
adequate monitoring by the competent agencies.
Several
children have allegedly fallen to their deaths from unprotected ledges in
buildings housing returnee families in Kabul. ŠAI
9. Conclusion
In a report on refugee returns to Afghanistan issued in July 2002 Amnesty
International urged that return must be sustainable in order to break the cycle
of displacement. The organization further stressed that it was incumbent on
those engaged in facilitating repatriation to ensure that refugees were fully
informed about the lack of sustainability of the current situation, as a
consequence both of instability and the diminishing absorption capacity.(45)
Ten months on little has changed in Afghanistan. If anything, the security
situation in the country is deteriorating, and large premature return movements
have stretched the absorption capacity of the country to near breaking point.
Amnesty International
believes that Afghanistan's long term reconstruction should not be held hostage
to a rush to return people to an unsustainable situation. At present the
situation in Afghanistan can not be said to have fundamentally, durably and
effectively changed.(46) In the political, social and economic circumstances of
Afghanistan today it is further unlikely that repatriation can be promoted in
the foreseeable future.
While the fall of the
Taleban regime and the institution of the Afghan Transitional Administration
has created an opportunity for fundamental change in Afghanistan, the
precarious and volatile nature of the current security situation, including in
Kabul, the ongoing and increasing factional fighting between commanders and the
resurgence of forces allied to the Taleban, tell of a country still teetering
on the edge of collapse.
Amnesty International
therefore urges the Afghan Transitional Administration, states hosting Afghan
refugees, and the wider international community to put their efforts into
ensuring that sufficient and effective reconstruction assistance in material
and financial terms is available to Afghanistan, that an effective degree of
security is provided in the whole of the country and that national institutions
of justice, policing and social reform are able to operate in a
rights-respecting manner throughout the country. Only when these conditions are
fulfilled will it be possible for refugees and IDPs to break the cycle of
displacement and return to their places of origin in a manner that is truly
voluntary and sustainable.
10. Recommendations
To the Afghan
Transitional Administration
The Afghan Transitional
Administration should ensure
1. The safety, dignity and
security of returnees, including full respect for their human rights;
2. That all returnees are able to return to their
previous homes;
3. That suitable land is allocated to landless returnees;
4. That property dispute mechanisms, including transparent, independent and accountable
tribunals, for returnees with a disputed property claim are instituted as a
matter of urgency. It should ensure in particular that these mechanisms are
designed to be accessible and responsive to the needs of unaccompanied women
and female-headed households. Competent legal advice should be provided to
those returnees, including women, who require such assistance in the pursuit of
their property claims.
To neighbouring states
hosting Afghan refugees
Neighbouring host states,
in particular the Governments of Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran
should ensure that
1. All refugees and asylum
seekers on their territories are treated at all times in accordance with
international standards of human rights and refugee protection. In particular refugees
and asylum seekers should not be subject to arbitrary detention, torture or
ill-treatment while in detention, or discriminatory police checks;
2. Refugees and asylum seekers are not subject to
violations of their human rights, including their economic, social and cultural
rights, in an attempt to force them to repatriate to their country of origin;
3. Refugees and asylum seekers are able to make
"go and see" or "go and work" visits, while being able to
return to the host country if they find that they cannot sustain their return,
or if they face persecution upon their return. Refugees who return to the host
country after such a visit must not be penalized, including by being denied
adequate documentation;
4. Refugees still entitled to international protection
are not forcibly returned from the territory of the host state. Neighbouring
host states should refrain from the mass forcible return of refugees and asylum
seekers from their territory. States should also ensure that a person whose
deportation is being contemplated is provided at the earliest instance with
full information and adequate and competent legal representation, and is able
to effectively and individually appeal any decision taken by the state. No
individual should be returned in any way whatsoever to a situation in which she
is in danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment;
5. The human rights of all refugees and asylum seekers
are upheld in the course of "assisted" return movements. Particular
care should be paid to the needs of unaccompanied women, minors, the elderly
and the ill during any such movements.
To non-neighbouring
states hosting Afghan refugees and asylum-seekers
All other governments
hosting Afghan refugees, asylum seekers and rejected asylum seekers should
ensure that
1. While voluntary
repatriation may be facilitated if it is requested by the refugee, asylum
seeker or rejected asylum seeker, states should refrain from promoting, or
otherwise encouraging including by means of penalties/coercive measures,
voluntary repatriation;
2. Government officials with responsibility for
refugee status determination and authorities with a responsibility for the
execution of expulsion orders are kept fully and objectively informed of the
human rights situation in the whole of Afghanistan;
3. Safety, dignity and full respect for human rights is maintained in the
country of asylum, and during any period of transit in the course of return;
4. The responsibility to uphold the safety, dignity and full respect for the human
rights of the returning individual does not cease at the time of departure at
the port of exit nor at transit centres in the major urban areas of
Afghanistan. If the sending government is unable to uphold these rights up
until the individual is reintegrated in her home or other settlement of choice,
this responsibility must be ceded to a competent and accountable body governed
by a human rights framework.
5. Rejected asylum seekers are not forcibly returned unless it is possible to
make an objective determination that this return can be effected in conditions
of safety, dignity and with full respect for the human rights, including the
economic, social and cultural rights, of the returning asylum seeker. States
should be guided by UNHCR in considering the timing of the forced return of
rejected asylum seekers;
To the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
UNHCR should
1. In accordance with its
mandate, ensure that a comprehensive assessment, including a human rights
assessment, of conditions in all parts of Afghanistan is made before concluding
that conditions are conducive to the promotion of voluntary repatriation;
2. Be more explicit in practice in ensuring that the
conceptual difference between facilitation and promotion of voluntary
repatriation is maintained;
3. Play an active role in the implementation of
voluntary repatriation standards at all stages of the process; before
departure, during transit and after return. Such standards must, given the
continuing precarious security situation and lack of adequate infrastructure,
give effect to the importance of phased and coordinated returns;
4. Provide accurate, unambiguous and accessible
information on the security and material situation in Afghanistan to refugees,
asylum seekers and IDPs, including in particular to women refugees, asylum
seekers and IDPs. UNHCR should actively refrain from giving the impression to
refugees, asylum seekers and host states that it is promoting voluntary
repatriation;
5. Ensure that it intercedes strongly with host states
to ensure that refugees and asylum seekers are not subject to refoulement
whether explicit in the form of forcible returns, or in the form of
"constructive refoulement" such as through the denial of basic
economic, social and cultural rights;
6. Conduct comprehensive and regular monitoring of the
protection and other post-return needs of refugees and IDPs. Such monitoring
should include effective attention to the needs of women and girls, and should
be oriented towards follow-up action. Regular and transparent reports of these
monitoring exercises should be made available to all stakeholders;
7. Expand its protection, monitoring and assistance
activities to the major urban centres, including Kabul.
To donors and the
International Community
The international
community, including donors, should
1. Ensure that, as a matter
of urgency, sufficient material and financial resources are provided in order
to undertake reconstruction, capacity-building, demobilization, disarmament and
de-mining programmes in Afghanistan, paying particular attention to the
reintegration and rehabilitation needs of returnees.
2. Ensure without delay that they deliver on the financial commitments they
have already made towards this end;
3. Institute measures in order to ensure an adequate level of security and
human protection throughout Afghanistan, including by giving active
consideration to the extension of ISAF's mandate;
4. Provide neighbouring host states, especially Pakistan and Iran, and relevant
agencies with sufficient resources for the protection of Afghan refugees until
such time as a voluntary repatriation in conditions of safety, dignity and
respect for human rights is possible;
5. Provide international and inter-governmental agencies engaged in assisting
returnees and IDPs in Afghanistan with sufficient resources to enable them to
render this assistance meaningful.
To the World Food
Programme (WFP)
WFP should
1. Ensure that the rights
and needs of returnees and IDPs are at the centre of the design of any exit
strategy for food distribution programmes, and should refrain from halting
operations to populations that remain in need of food assistance. The design of
exit strategies should pay particular attention to the needs of vulnerable
individuals, such as unaccompanied women, minors, the elderly and the ill.
To the International
Organization for Migration (IOM)
IOM should
1. Abide by international
standards governing voluntary return at all stages of the return process; before
departure, during transit and after return;
2. Ensure that returnees are transported all the way to their villages of
origin or places of preferred destination. Where IOM has information that
conditions in or en route to the destination are insecure, IOM should suspend
transport and inform partner agencies, including UNHCR, of this fact before any
transport movement is organized.
********
(1) See Amnesty
International (AI), Afghanistan: Continuing need for protection and standards
for return of Afghan refugees, July 2002 (AI Index: ASA 11/014/2002), p. 1.
(2) United States Committee
for Refugees (USCR), World refugee survey 2003, 29 May 2003.
(3) One press report of
this attack noted 'a suicide attack against a bus carrying international
peacekeepers yesterday brought bloodshed and fear to the Afghan capital, Kabul,
and blew apart claims that the city has become an island of relative safety.'
The Independent on Sunday, Suicide bomb kills four German soldiers as Afghan
militants target peacekeepers, 8 June 2003.
(4) President Karzai
recently stated that even the amount of reconstruction assistance pledged at
the Tokyo Conference, held in January 2002, was insufficient for Afghanistan's
needs. He estimated that Afghanistan needed between $15 billion and $20 billion
over the next five years 'to rebuild vital social and economic infrastructure
and to combat terrorism and drugs production.' The Asian Development Bank (ADB)
has noted in addition that 'only a small proportion' of the $5.1 billion
pledged at the Tokyo Conference has actually been received in the country.
ADB.org, Afghanistan faces funding shortfall, says ADB, 6 June 2003.
(5) See, for example, AI
documents, Afghanistan: Refugee returns should not be encouraged (AI Index: ASA
11/012/2002), 20 June 2002, AI, Afghanistan: Human rights concerns - a message
from NGOs to donors (AI Index: ASA 11/016/2002), 18 December 2002; Afghanistan:
Donor assistance necessary to rebuild shattered judicial system (AI Index: ASA
11/018/2002), 19 December 2002; and Afghanistan: Police reconstruction
essential for the protection of human rights (AI Index: ASA 11/011/2003), 12
March 2003.
(6) Amnesty International
has had an Afghanistan field presence, based in Kabul city, since June 2002.
(7) UNHCR Briefing Note, Afghanistan:
Returns surge in May, 6 June 2003.
(8) UNHCR Briefing Note,
Afghan Refugee Returns, 31 May 2002. It is important to note, though, that the
figures for much of the 2002 repatriation are estimates at best, being
distorted by 'recyclers', seasonal migrants, and returnees who have since left
Afghanistan again in search of refuge. See Afghanistan Research and Evaluation
Unit (AREU), Taking Refugees for a Ride? The Politics of Refugee Return to
Afghanistan, December 2002.
(9) In addition, countries
in the region, such as India and Tajikistan, currently host an estimated 30,000
refugees. Industrialised non-neighbouring states, such as countries of the
European Union (EU) and Australia, also have on their territory a number of
refugees, asylum seekers and failed asylum seekers from Afghanistan. The
numbers for these latter groups are less well established. The European
Commission, for instance, estimates that there are currently up to 400,000
Afghans, with varying status, in the territory of EU states.
(10) UNHCR, Considerations
relating to the provision of protection and assistance to internally displaced
persons in Afghanistan, July 2002, p. 1.
(11) The report will return
to the issue of whether, in fact, many of these decisions to return were truly
voluntary.
(12) Agence France Presse,
Afghan refugee returns top 100,000 this year: UN, 22 May 2003.
(13) See AI, Afghanistan:
Continuing need for protection and standards for return of Afghan refugees (AI
Index: ASA 11/014/2002) and AREU, Taking refugees for a ride? The politics of
refugee return to Afghanistan, December 2002, pages 19-25.
(14) See AI documents,
Afghanistan: Continuing need for protection and standards for return of Afghan
refugees, July 2002 (AI Index: ASA 11/014/2002); Afghanistan: Refugees fleeing
the war are an international responsibility, 7 December 2001 (AI Index: ASA
11/044/2001); and Pakistan: Refugees must not be forced back to an unstable
Afghanistan, 14 December 2001 (AI Index: ASA 33/030/2001).
(15) Refoulement is the
forcible return of persons to a country where they may face serious human
rights abuses.
(16) Large sections of
Nasir Bagh camp were bulldozed in 2002 as refugees were, often forcibly, moved
out. Jalozai camp was officially closed in February 2002. The deadline for
closure of the Kacha Garhi camp has now been extended to March 2004.
(17) AREU, Taking refugees
for a ride? The politics of refugee return to Afghanistan, December 2002, p.
32.
(18) Iranian authorities
have, since June 2001, officially banned the employment of "illegal
immigrants". The latter category, however, includes a large proportion of
Afghan refugees who had failed to register as refugees during a registration
drive in 2001, or had entered Iran after 2001, and are therefore considered
"undocumented".
(19) Iran has announced
that it will be ending permanent residence for Afghan refugees as of 23
September 2003. The head of the Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrants
Affairs, Ahmad Hosseini, stated that 'planning has been made in such a way that
the file of Afghan refugees in Iran will have been closed by the end of 1383
[the Islamic year 1382 started on 21 March 2003]. IRNA, Iran scraps permanent
residence for Afghan refugees, 24 May 2003.
(20) In addition, AREU
stated that between April and December 2002, 113 unaccompanied women and 218
unaccompanied children were deported from Iran to Afghanistan. See AREU, Taking
refugees for a ride? The politics of refugee return to Afghanistan, December
2002, p. 31.
(21) AI document;
Afghanistan: Continuing need for protection and standards for return of Afghan
refugees, (AI Index ASA 11/014/2002), p. 4.
(22) See IRIN, Tajikistan:
Deportation of Afghans halted, 2 October 2002.
(23) See Amnesty
International, UK/Afghanistan: Forced return of asylum seekers unacceptable (AI
Index: ASA 11/012/2003), 28 April 2003.
(24) Ibid, p. 8.
(25) Kuchi nomads are a
Pashtun speaking ethnic group who historically have traveled with their herds
in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran.
(26) UNHCR, Considerations
relating to the provision of protection and assistance to internally displaced
persons in Afghanistan, July 2002. Amnesty International considers that
voluntary repatriation should not include return to so-called 'safe areas' or
to conditions of internal displacement. This applies equally to situations of
IDP as well as refugee return. Thus, while the causes of and solutions to
displacement are likely to be very similar in Afghanistan, Amnesty
International does not consider that the return of refugees to internal displacement
will be either lawful or sustainable in Afghanistan.
(27) Principle 15 a. and
d.. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement were issued by the UN
Secretary General's Special Representative on IDPs, Francis Deng, in 1998, and identify
the rights and guarantees relevant to the protection of the internally
displaced in all phases of displacement.
(28) See UNHCR, Handbook
Voluntary Repatriation : International Protection, 1996, section 3.1.
(29) Ibid, section 4.2.
(30) AREU, p. 29.
(31) UNHCR itself has
asserted that "where UNHCR considers that conditions remain objectively
too uncertain to permit the fulfillment of guarantees of safety or amnesties,
where the return of large groups of refugees would severely overstretch the absorption
capacity of the home country...it is UNHCR's responsibility to provide guidance
and make its position known." UNHCR, Handbook Voluntary Repatriation:
International Protection, section 3.3. Throughout 2002, UNHCR acted
ambiguously; while stating that it did not consider conditions ripe for
promoted return, it was at the same time very publicly announcing its role in
"the largest single refugee repatriation since 1972." Frequent
statements about the "improved political climate in Afghanistan" were
not matched with strong messages about the lack of security in several parts of
the country and, as importantly, about the inability of the devastated country
to absorb such large numbers of returnees.
(32) Returning refugees are
only entitled to a one-off reintegration package consisting of limited cash and
material aid, such as wheat and blankets. However, Amnesty International
interviewed a number of refugees who had been given the impression that the
international community would continue to provide food and shelter assistance
to returnees. Most of the returnees we spoke to, such as Shokhana who was
living in an informal settlement in Kabul since returning from Pakistan in
summer 2002, were under the impression that this assistance would continue for
up to six months after arrival in Afghanistan.
(33) AI, Afghanistan:
Continuing need for protection and standards for return of Afghan refugees (AI
Index: ASA 11/014/2002), p. 15.
(34) The UN reported in May
2003 that it had suspended mine clearing activities on the route between Kabul
and Kandahar following a spate of attacks against mine-clearing staff.
Currently, mine clearing in 14 provinces in the south of the country have been
suspended due to insecure conditions. See UN News, UN again suspends mine clearance
in parts of Afghanistan, 29 May 2003.
(35) In addition to the
bombing of an ISAF bus near Kabul airport, the following incidents have been
reported in Kabul; On 17 April, a bomb reportedly exploded 3 km northwest of
the city centre of Kabul and authorities found a second bomb at the scene. On
13 May, two Norwegian ISAF soldiers were injured, one seriously, when they were
shot at in northern Kabul. On 20 May 2003, a grenade was thrown into a NGO
vehicle in the centre of Kabul. On 30 May, a German ISAF soldier was killed and
a second soldier was injured when their vehicle hit a landmine during a patrol
in southeast Kabul.
(36) UN Security Council,
Unstable, insufficient security in Afghanistan casts long shadow over peace
process, Special Representative tells Security Council, 4750th Meeting,
SC/7751, 6 May 2003. Attempts to increase security outside of Kabul through the
creation of 'Provincial Reconstruction Teams', which comprise military and
civilian personnel drawn from the US-led Coalition and which are operating in a
small number of provincial capitals, have until now proved largely ineffective
at building security.
(37) See AI document;
Afghanistan : Police reconstruction essential for the protection of human
rights (AI Index: ASA 1/003/2003), 12 March 2003.
(38) Known as osher, this
is a tax of 10 percent of one's income traditionally paid to the government
authorities. However, despite the fact that this practice has been forbidden by
President Karzai until such time as there is a functioning government in place,
local commanders continue to extort osher for their personal use.
(39) See also AREU, Land
rights in crisis: Restoring tenure security in Afghanistan, March 2003, p. 73.
(40) It is likely, however,
that this figure might be slightly inflated, not least by refugees being
unwilling to disclose the extent of their assets for fear of losing any
additional benefits. See AREU, Land rights in crisis: restoring tenure security
in Afghanistan, March 2003, p. 63.
(41) Ibid., pages 63-64.
(42) It has also been the
case for several returnees that, having lived in exile in urban environments
for years, many have lost the skills necessary to their previous agrarian
professions. Many, consequently, are forced to return to Afghanistan's cities.
(43) Thus of the 668,000
people who had returned to Kabul, Nangarhar and Balkh provinces by the
beginning of August 2002, UNHCR reported that 53 percent went back to the urban
centres of Kabul city, Jalalabad and Mazar-i-Sharif. UNHCR, Afghanistan:
returns begin to tail off, Briefing Note, 6 August 2002.
(44) IRIN, Afghanistan :
Continuing repatriation could cause destabilization, says NGO, 7 February 2003.
(45) AI, Afghanistan:
Continuing need for protection and standards for return of Afghan refugees (AI
Index: ASA 11/014/2002)
(46) See Ibid, pp. 16-17
for the threshold standards at which such provisions may be implemented.
|
AI INDEX: ASA
11/014/2003 23 June 2003
|
|
Related Documents
|
||||||
|